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Introduction 
 
In 2014, Kenya and Uganda were two of the top three recipients of official development 
assistance (ODA) in Africa (OECD n.d.). The funding focused on education, health care, 
infrastructure, entrepreneurship development, HIV/AIDS treatment, conflict prevention and 
relief from natural crises such as droughts, famines or earthquakes. Such a mixed bag of 
funding priorities points to the variegated nature of the development agenda of both the 
funding actors and the recipient countries. This broad scope, however, obscures the recent 
shifts and developments with regard to the major challenge of violence and conflict facing 
the region, and the growing importance of this field for donors and national governments. 
The Eastern Africa region in general currently faces security and violence challenges linked 
to terrorism, internal armed conflicts and resources-based conflicts, as well as insecurity 
linked to everyday crime. These forms of insecurity and violence are seen both by the states 
of the region and by Western donor states as a threat to state stability as well as the region’s 
development ambitions. Violence reduction is therefore a shared goal both within Eastern 
Africa and among these Western donor nations. This study seeks to critically examine the 
shifts and trends in current donor funding in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and South 
Sudan aimed at reducing violence and conflict. It analyses key issues being funded as well 
as trends in donor funding. 
 
It is notable that there is a long tradition of donor support to conflict reduction and prevention 
in the region, as well as support to security sector and policing reforms. However, recent 
years have witnessed a shift in this support, with the appearance of new security 
emergencies in the form of terrorist threats in, for example, Kenya and Somalia, and threats 
of state disintegration in places such as South Sudan. Of course, the agenda of conflict and 
violence prevention has not always been without its ambiguities even in earlier years, and 
the donor priorities and those of the populations in the region have not always converged. 
 
In a sense, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular Goal 16, are 
meant to ensure that interventions for violence reduction and prevention as well as 
development are part of a common and shared vision.  
 
Goal 16 aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels’. It recognises the link between peace and prevention of violence and conflict and 
the building and strengthening of functioning and inclusive societies. While the SDGs 
represent a powerful political commitment by the member states of the United Nations to 
work towards a common development agenda, the recognition of the linkages that Goal 16 
makes between peace, security and development is not entirely new. Indeed, the link 
between security and development was made quite eloquently by the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report. An examination of the funding trends on violence in the Eastern Africa 
region demonstrates that most donor projects explicitly recognise this link. Funding for 
various violence prevention interventions also seeks to promote good governance, better 
functioning law and order and justice institutions, and to promote cohesion among other 
institutions. It therefore seems that if the funding interventions have not worked as expected, 
it is not because the link had not been made. 
 
What is distinct, though, and is in keeping with a more targeted approach, is that funding 
takes different forms depending on the contexts of violence in various countries. Thus in 
Somalia, support to reduce violence takes the form of strengthening the capacities of the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to effectively combat the threat from Al-
Shabaab. In Southern Sudan, support to violence prevention takes the form of 
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demobilisation of armed militias, and the strengthening of the state military, among other 
things. In Kenya and Uganda, violence prevention is different as there are no active 
conflicts. Thus in Kenya, for instance, the focus of the support is on pastoralist conflicts, 
ethnic conflict and strengthening of justice and law and order institutions. 
 
This study demonstrates that donors have a variety of security and commercial interests in 
the region, and these are not always neatly separable from conflict and security priorities: for 
example if they fund initiatives to counter violent extremism, they will still at the same time 
seek to enhance economic relations with the host country. Choosing to support a range of 
themes is moreover a smart political choice as it allows the donors to expand their playing 
field (Scheye 2010). Donors’ decisions are also shaped by assessments and calculations of 
risks as well as by what benefits them the most.  
 
Geo-political realities and interests also significantly shape the relationship between the 
states in the region and donors. As this report later analyses, donors have had to confront 
the changing political realities within the recipient countries, which has forced them to shelve 
some of the projects they intended to fund or establish. In addition, the number of bilateral 
and multilateral donors has increased over the years, which has led to more funds, ideas 
and tools on how development can be achieved (Severino and Ray 2011). This has made 
the donor market more diversified, posing new challenges to the ‘traditional’ donors in 
Europe and the US, which have been forced to adopt new ways of relating to countries that 
they support.  
 
This report shows that violence prevention appears to be integrated in many of the donor 
support programmes in the Eastern Africa region. In keeping with the understanding that 
security is linked to most of the development and governance interventions, it is clear that 
funding cannot be easily segmented into one theme – except possibly for military support. 
The various funding themes are not mutually exclusive, nor are funding programmes 
necessarily designed according to a logic that allows for clear boundaries. They intersect 
and sometimes overlap. Even an examination of the objectives of the funding may not offer 
much illumination. For instance, funding that seeks to support conflict prevention in the 
Karamoja (Uganda) or Turkana (Kenya) areas may involve support to community resilience, 
support to police services, and accountability interventions. Likewise, support to countering 
violent extremism (CVE) work appears to cut across all these sub-themes or strands. Apart 
from explicitly designating resources for CVE projects, donors are also funding interventions 
that touch on the push and pull factors leading youth to extremism. These include youth 
unemployment, local grievances over land and exclusion from leadership, security 
accountability and better relations with the community. These patterns have implications for 
how we think about funding as sectoral, yet in reality the sectors are sometimes so 
interlinked that their boundaries make little policy sense. It also suggests that in reality 
violence reduction and prevention is about rebuilding whole and effective communities and 
societies. 
 
Research data for this study was collected using primary and secondary methods. 
Interviews for the primary research were held with diplomats and donor representatives, 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) officers and experts closely working with donors in 
the region. Secondary data entailed collection and analysis of data from relevant research 
reports and databases, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics, donor and 
NGO reports and other sources. The report begins with a contextual discussion of conflict 
and violence in the region, before mapping out the key funders, themes/issues supported 
and the actors involved. It then discusses the shifts in funding and what these portend for 
violence reduction policy and programming.  
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1 Political environment for conflict and 
violence funding 
 
The political environment in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia is 
challenging and is constantly changing. There is also considerable variation across countries 
within the region. Some countries, like South Sudan, are still confronting a civil war; as 
indeed is Somalia which is combating the challenge of Al-Shabaab and still does not have a 
government with effective control of the country. Uganda has made significant strides in 
dealing with armed conflict particularly in the north of the country but is still grappling with 
questions of post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction as well as threats from terrorism. 
Similarly, Ethiopia and Kenya are also facing terrorist threats, particularly from the Al-
Shabaab movement. All of these countries are also at different stages in democratisation 
and strengthening of the rule of law. Across these countries, several layers of conflict and 
violence can be discerned: 
1.1 Terrorism 
Instability in Somalia continues to pose a serious threat to regional stability. Beset by civil 
war for over two decades, Somalia’s troubled past has been characterised by armed 
warfare, failed peace agreements and recurring humanitarian crises (Menkhaus 2014). 
Although the disintegration of the central government and destruction of its security sector is 
traced to the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia’s degeneration began soon 
after its independence in 1960 (Dagne 2009; Bryden and Brickhill 2010). Progressively, an 
informal security sector began to swell and Somalia’s collapse led to the proliferation of 
various militia groups, most of whom had been unhappy with Siad Barre’s leadership. With 
accumulated arms and weapons, many in the former Somalia Army retreated to their clans. 
This set the stage for the current state of affairs in Somalia (Bryden and Brickhill 2010). 
 
Since the 2000s, Somalia has been the regional epicentre of violent extremism, particularly 
with the rise in 2006 of the Al-Shabaab terror group, which currently controls some sections 
of the country, particularly in the southern and central regions. Al-Shabaab has recruited 
many Somalis and fighters of other nationalities, including women, into its ranks and also 
conducted numerous attacks within Somalia. The group is fighting the Somali Federal 
Government in Mogadishu as well as the 22,000-strong foreign troops deployed by AMISOM 
to support the federal government and secure the country.  
 
Due to the success of AMISOM, the frequency of Al-Shabaab attacks has significantly 
reduced and the group has been forced to switch to indiscriminate attacks on civilians in 
Somalia (ACLED Report No. 34, 2015). However, Al-Shabaab has proved difficult to defeat, 
as it is reported to have sufficient funding from its control over activities such as charcoal 
exports at Kismayo, taxation of local businesses and piracy (Journalists for Justice 2015). In 
addition, Al-Shabaab still retains control over large territories of Somalia and key transport 
routes (Human Rights Watch 2016). Of late, a section of the terror group has declared 
allegiance to the militant group, the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS).  
 
The Al-Shabaab terror group is, however, transnational in nature, with its members carrying 
out attacks in Kenya and Uganda as well as increasing recruitment in these countries. Since 
Kenya stepped up its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, ostensibly to buffer the 
country from Al-Shabaab attacks, attacks on Kenyan soil have actually multiplied, ranging 
from the September 2013 siege of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall, to the 2015 attack on 
Garissa University, and to village massacres, and the targeted killings of police and religious 
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figures (Dowd 2015; Bogorad 2016). Further, deep-seated grievances, including a sense of 
marginalisation among Kenya’s ethnic and religious minorities, have provided fertile ground 
for Al-Shabaab to localise its war in Kenya (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015). Lately it has 
emerged that Kenyan women are also being recruited to join Al-Shabaab or ISIS in Syria 
(Agutu 2016). 
 
On 11 July 2010 two separate suicide bombings took place in Kampala, Uganda, as fans 
watched the FIFA World Cup Finals. The attacks left 79 people dead and 70 others injured. 
Al-Shabaab immediately claimed responsibility as retaliation for Ugandan support for 
AMISOM (BBC News 2010). In March 2015, seven Kenyans, five Ugandans and one 
Tanzanian were each charged with terrorism, murder, attempted murder and of being 
accessories to terrorism, and all except one were accused of being Al-Shabaab members. 
Fourteen months later, five of the suspects were sentenced to life imprisonment and two 
others to 50 years in jail for masterminding the twin blasts. Five others were released for 
lack of evidence while one other was sentenced to one year of community service (Europe 
News Week 2016). 
 
These incidents demonstrate the capacity of Al-Shabaab to inflict serious harm and tragic 
loss of life, in a conflict that has become increasingly regionalised in East Africa. Countering 
the threat of Al-Shabaab has therefore become a major priority for both donors and 
countries in the region. Currently, about 22,000 troops seconded from the military forces of 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are deployed in the country under the mandate of 
AMISOM, to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Most of the funding, as we shall later see, is from 
various multilateral donors.  
1.2 Natural resources-driven conflicts 
Competition for natural resources and access to land is a major driver of conflict in the 
pastoral frontier areas. The focus here is not only on the oil, gas and minerals found on the 
ground, but also on access to land as the primary resource. This adds to the perennial 
conflicts in the Horn of Africa within and across borders and has direct implications for 
political stability in the region, especially in the arid north-eastern region of Karamoja in 
Uganda and northern Kenya. Perennial conflicts between the Karamojong, Turkana, 
Samburu and Pokot have continued to present some of the most significant threats to 
security in the region. This has been exacerbated by unresolved boundary disputes that 
have found new significance in part as a result of the new system of devolved governance in 
Kenya and also contention over access to water and grazing resources. In places where 
there have been new resource discoveries, such as oil in Turkana, new conflicts have 
emerged over access to jobs in oil exploration companies. Adding to the lethal nature of 
these resource conflicts is the ready availability of small arms and light weapons originating 
from border areas of Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia (Manatuk 2016).  
 
Governments across East Africa are pursing multi-million dollar infrastructure programmes, 
mainly in the marginal frontier areas of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, adding another layer of 
resource conflict. These investments include the US$29bn Lamu Port–South Sudan–
Ethiopia Transport Corridor project (LAPSSET) (The Presidency 2016a; Lapsset Corridor 
Development Authority 2016), Turkana wind power project (Lake Turkana Wind Power 
2016), Djibouti–Addis railway line (Ethiopian News Agency 2016), Ethiopia’s US$4.8bn 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and power station (Impregilo 2016). These 
developments are taking place in and crossing remote regions and pastoral frontiers (Korf, 
Hagmann and Emmenegger 2015), where the governments were previously absent or weak, 
and that have been neglected throughout the years due to their harsh terrain and weather as 
well as low agricultural potential. Nevertheless, they are now resource frontiers, where the 
relevant state is planning and developing them with an aim of absorbing its inhabitants as 
part of the nation-state. For example, since independence, northern Kenya has remained 
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marginalised, with little or no education and public services. Other problems include poor 
infrastructure, lack of proper housing and health facilities, food and water shortages. The 
Kenyan government has, however, in recent years put in resources to tap into the recently 
discovered oil and gas in Turkana. In Ethiopia, most projects are established outside the 
core ‘highland’ area of central and northern Ethiopia, which includes areas associated 
historically with the ethnic base of the Amhara and Tigrayan populations, as well as parts of 
the Shewan highland plateau. These areas have remained marginalised and attempts by 
successive Ethiopian governments to integrate them have largely ended in failure (Mosley 
2012). 
 
These large-scale investments have generated tensions and provoked incidents of violence 
in places like Turkana, where there has been contestation over ownership of the land where 
the oil blocks are situated. Similar tensions have emerged in Lamu where a port is being 
constructed as part of the LAPSSET project (Anyadike 2014). Similarly, in the Ethiopia–
Somalia border area there has been a rush for land acquisition triggered by an economic 
boom in response to demand for range lands, charcoal and irrigated farms (Mosley 2012). 
This area remains contested, however, with armed groups – for example, the Oromo 
Liberation Front, Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Tigray, Ethiopian People’s 
Patriotic Front, among others – posing a national security threat. 
1.3 Internal political stresses 
Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia have been facing various forms of violence internally. Crime 
and insecurity persist as major problems in both urban and rural areas of Kenya and 
Uganda. For many Kenyans, ordinary crime in the form of assaults, robbery, car-jacking and 
burglary constitute the main causes of insecurity. In recent years, Kenya has also seen the 
proliferation of criminal cartels engaged in the trafficking in drugs, guns, humans and animal 
trophies that now threaten to undermine the governance and security systems (Gastrow 
2011).  
 
Devolution has added new layers and forms of political tensions between the national and 
county governments with regard to roles and powers and has precipitated power struggles 
as well as conflicts related to resource allocation from national to county governments, 
between county governments and within counties (ACLED Report No. 24, 2014). Devolved 
governments have seemingly also contributed to an increase in inter-ethnic conflicts, owing 
to emerging competition between communities for power at the county level (ACLED Report 
No. 28, 2014).  
 
In Ethiopia, members of the Oromo ethnic group have been engaging in widespread protests 
against plans to expand the territory of Addis Ababa municipality into land that belongs to 
the Oromia national state. They have also been protesting about what they perceive as 
continued marginalisation and persecution by the government. These protests were violently 
put down by security forces: hundreds were arrested and over 50 people reportedly killed 
(Awol 2016).  
1.4 South Sudan conflict 
Regional efforts to broker an end to the conflict in South Sudan have faltered while fighting 
has continued in many areas, including targeted killings based on ethnicity, rape, the 
recruitment of child soldiers and other crimes. On 15 December 2013, fighting in the 
barracks of the presidential guards marked the onset of the violence that eventually resulted 
in civil war in South Sudan. Though the conflict later subsided, it was to later escalate in July 
2016, forcing former vice-president Riek Machar to flee the capital Juba and leading to his 
replacement by General Taban Deng.  
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The conflict has strained South Sudan’s foreign relations with many donors, who have 
shifted funds from support of the government’s efforts in developing the country towards 
direct humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2016). It has also led to increased refugee flows in 
the region. During the height of the violence in July 2016, more than 8,300 South Sudanese 
refugees were said to have fled into neighbouring Uganda in a single day. In a week, more 
than 26,000 South Sudanese had travelled south to Uganda (Standard Media 2016). About 
1.61 million people are displaced internally in South Sudan while 818,950 others have 
sought refuge in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya, making the situation a regional 
security concern (OCHA 2016). The resurgence of conflict in Juba in early July 2016 is likely 
to worsen already precarious food insecurity for many, and to disrupt livelihoods, access to 
humanitarian assistance and markets (UN Mission South Sudan 2016). 
 
Apart from the conflicts, the Eastern Africa region has also in the last ten years seen the 
emergence of assertive leaders like President Uhuru Kenyatta (The Presidency 2016b), 
President Paul Kagame (Kagame 2016) and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn Boshe who succeeded the late Meles Zenawi in 2012. These leaders have been 
championing the strengthening of cooperation between African countries. They have also 
been insisting that the international community should partner with African countries as 
equal partners and they have not shied away from using their natural resources as leverage 
in pushing their countries’ interests. This, as we shall see later, has led to redefined donor 
relations and affected the flow of aid into Kenya and Rwanda. Before discussing these shifts, 
Section 2 looks at the key issues influencing donors’ funding in the region. 
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2 Factors influencing donor funding  
 
Globally, ODA funding for conflict prevention, peace and security has increased by 67 per 
cent since 2005. It peaked at US$3.9bn in 2009 after an increase of US$1.1bn (47 per cent) 
from 2007 to 2008 alone, but then declined to US$3bn in 2012, and has stabilised since 
then. Increased funding in response to the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan explains the 
significant rise in ODA funding between 2007 and 2009 (Development Initiatives 2016). The 
rise in refugee costs did not significantly eat into development programmes, with around half 
of donor countries using money from outside their aid budgets to cover refugee costs 
(Eurostat 2016). 
 
The long-term trajectory of aid, however, remains uncertain, and characterised by 
countervailing trends. On the one hand, it is feared in the long run, funds will start reducing 
and there are already indications of this; for example, Sweden, which currently spends a 
higher percentage of overall gross national income on development aid than any other 
country in the world, has indicated it might cut its ODA by as much as 60 per cent so that it 
can refocus on the refugee and immigration flows (The Guardian 2016a, 2016b).  
 
The Norwegian government is considering diverting 21 per cent of its US$4.8bn ODA budget 
into supporting domestic refugees for their first year in Norway. In 2015, Finland cut its aid 
budget by 43 per cent (The Guardian 2016c, 2016d) while Denmark will cut more than 
US$600m from its ODA to make room for domestic refugee expenses in 2016 (CPH Post 
2015). The trend suggests an end to what some have termed ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ 
(Morten and Torbjørn 2015) in providing support to sub-Saharan Africa. This could create a 
trend across Europe, resulting in drastic cuts to development projects and creating 
uncertainty at a time when there is need for long-term consistency and commitment from 
donor countries in supporting the SDGs. Ultimately, people facing extreme poverty will see 
any chance of improving their lives sharply diminished. 
 
Alongside the increased refugee and immigration flows, however, Europe is increasingly 
facing carefully planned attacks from both unsophisticated lone-actors and well-coordinated 
terrorists, a situation which has elevated the threat of terrorist attacks in Europe, and may 
have indirect implications for funding in the East African region. In 2015, 211 failed, foiled 
and completed terrorist attacks were recorded in six European Union (EU) member states, 
which led to 151 deaths and over 360 people injured. A total of 1,077 individuals were 
arrested for terrorism-related offences, of whom 424 were in France alone (Europol 2016).  
 
In an indirect way, these attacks might in the long run lead to increased funding for counter-
terrorism initiatives being channelled to East Africa. The EU’s Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministerial Council has already urged for counter-terrorism efforts to be reinforced both at 
national and at EU levels, and that terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist 
financing are among the main threats to the internal security of the EU (Justice and Home 
Affairs Ministers 2016). This message was later reaffirmed by the European Parliament and 
EU heads of government who have highlighted the importance of counter-terrorist efforts. 
The European Agenda on Security has provided member states with a clear framework for 
working better together on security and it was the basis for the European Council’s 
endorsement of a renewed internal security strategy with terrorism as one of its three 
priorities, alongside organised crime and cyber-crime (European Commission 2016a). 
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2.1 Increased funding by other non-OECD donors 
There are more than 30 donor countries that operate outside the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee; the most prominent of those that currently channel funds to Africa 
are China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Kuwait and Thailand. The growing influence of these countries is not only 
leading to more choices and more finance for the developing world, it has forced traditional 
donors to rethink how and where they channel their funds. 
 
A conservative estimate by the OECD indicates that globally, total gross concessional 
development finance provided by Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa amounted to US$7.5bn in 2014 (OECD 2016a). 
Table 2.1 Global figures for ODA in US$bn, at current prices1 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2014  
(% of 
total) 
ODA from current 28 DAC member 
countries 
141.2 150.1 140.1 151.8 150.8 82.2 
ODA from 19 reporting countries outside 
the DAC 
7.1 9.5 6.8 16.9 25.2 13.7 
Estimated development cooperation flows 
from 10 non-reporting countries outside 
the DAC 
4.3 5.2 5.7 6.9 7.5 4.1 
Sub-total flows from non-DAC providers 11.4 14.7 12.5 23.8 32.7 17.8 
Estimated global total 152.6 164.8 152.6 175.6 183.5 100 
 
China now has a larger programme than Australia, spending US$6.4bn in 2013, and is on an 
upward trajectory, with an estimated average annual increase of almost 10 per cent over the 
last five years. The United Arab Emirates is another example of a non-traditional donor 
scaling up its aid programme. In 2013, it provided US$5.2bn of ODA, a 375 per cent 
increase on its 2012 ODA levels (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2016). Turkey, as 
discussed in Section 3.1 below, has invested a lot in Somalia in maintaining peace and 
security.  
 
Due to lack of detailed comprehensive data and information, it is not possible to accurately 
establish the extent to which these non-DAC reporting countries are providing funds to 
mitigate violence and conflict. However, it is clear that over time, they have increased their 
political influence, through which they have managed to negotiate quick access to markets in 
Africa, to the disadvantage of traditional donors. This is mainly because their development 
cooperation is often rooted in the tradition of South–South cooperation, and is less 
bureaucratic or tied to conditions that are unfavourable to developing countries (Kilama 
2016). China’s security engagement with Africa has been largely in supporting 
peacekeeping in places like South Sudan and in helping combat piracy off the coast of 
Somalia (Kamerling 2011). 
                                                 
1 Brazil and Mexico have not published data for all the years included in this table. To complete the table, Brazil’s development 
cooperation in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2010 and Mexico’s development 
cooperation in 2014 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2013; OECD (2016a). 
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2.2 Alignment behind national government policies  
Within the Eastern Africa region, all donors are aligning their support to national government 
plans such as Kenya’s Vision 2030,2 Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development 2010a, 2010b), and Uganda’s Vision 2040 (National 
Planning Authority 2013). Most of the donors in Somalia channel a large part of their aid 
through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), set up under the 
New Deal3 to encourage aid delivery through consolidated multi-donor funds. This approach 
emphasises strengthening national capacities, improving transparency and accountability, 
and making development more responsive to the needs and concerns of Somali citizens.4 
 
Alignment of projects behind national development policies is an attempt at aid effectiveness 
and creation of ownership of the processes and outcomes, promoted after the signing in 
2005 of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (OECD 2016b). The impetus behind the 
Declaration was the realisation that when donors’ aid programmes are built around a series 
of stand-alone projects they do not result in sustainable developments and are ‘in parallel’ 
with the country’s own institutions (OECD 2016c).  
 
While some progress had been made in harmonising donors’ work with countries’ own 
priorities, much more needed to be done. The aid process is still too strongly led by donor 
priorities and administered through donor channels, sometimes with the developing 
countries having little say in the matter. Donor interests are sometimes still prioritised over 
those of the host country.5 Donors’ alignment of priorities with those of host governments is 
a politically informed decision since it has the potential to enhance or undermine relations 
with the state; for example, in Ethiopia, donors complain that the tight state control of society 
has the potential to undermine donor efforts. Support given to Ethiopian civil society 
organisations (CSOs) is restricted by national laws. The challenge of government support 
and complementarity is also alluded to in Kenya, where Western donors have found it 
difficult to work with the state because of their respective governments’ support of Kenyan 
cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC).6 Nevertheless, ownership of the process and 
outcome is crucial for development to be sustainable over the long term. Governments in the 
developing world must exercise effective ownership over the development process, including 
over aid. It is fundamental that they do this in full consultation with, and with full 
accountability to, their citizens, including the poor and marginalised in society. 
2.3 From development to trade 
The other important shift that may have an overall impact on funding aimed at supporting 
violence and conflict reduction is the growing emphasis by many Western donors on 
prioritising business and trade interests with countries in the Eastern Africa region. 
Increasingly, the business agenda is being prioritised by all the donors, for various reasons. 
 
A major reason is that donors are facing huge pressures from their home countries to ensure 
that their companies win business locally. Effects of the 2008 economic crisis are still being 
felt in most of the Western countries, especially in the US and Europe, which are the leading 
ODA contributors. This is forcing governments to push their missions, especially in Africa, to 
look for opportunities for home companies to set up businesses and build markets for their 
                                                 
2 www.vision2030.go.ke/  
3 The ‘New Deal’ is a new approach to support fragile states that are trying to recover from conflict and rebuild their societies, 
their institutions, and their government. The New Deal for Somalia was endorsed at the Brussels Conference on 16 September 
2013. At the heart of Somalia’s New Deal is the Compact, which lays the foundation for building reliable, transparent, 
accountable and functioning state institutions, respectful of the fundamental rights, freedoms and equality of its citizens. It 
revolves around five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) designed to deliver inclusive politics, improved security, 
greater justice, strong foundations for economic recovery, and long-term systems to generate Somali revenue and services.   
4 Email interview with a donor operating in Somalia, 9 August 2016; see also Ellison (2016). 
5 Interview with a donor overseeing projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 5 August 2016; see also Kaufmann (2009). 
6 See analysis below on ‘changing and challenging political interests’. 
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goods and services. The feeling is that once a business is set up in Kenya, Rwanda, 
Uganda or Ethiopia the benefits will one way or another lead to increased resource flows 
from the home country.7 For example, the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kenya plans to 
reorient its focus towards trade by 2021. It has thus been steadily reducing its development 
cooperation budget from €25.4m in 2014 to €14.7m in 2017 and is projected to have a zero 
budget in 2021. The embassy’s development cooperation staff will be phased out gradually 
as well. At the same time, the regional role that the embassy already plays, with several 
attachés accredited for the region, will become more prominent. This strategy aims at 
increasing the involvement of the Dutch private sector in the embassy’s development 
programmes and in other sectors, in order to prepare for a transition from aid to trade.8 The 
development cooperation programme will be expected to focus on investing public funds 
with the aim of leveraging private investments (or investments from international financial 
institutions). Relations between Kenya and the Netherlands beyond 2020 will thus be 
characterised ‘by a vibrant mutually beneficial economic relationship, facilitated by strong 
government to government relations and selective use of business support instruments’.9  
 
Changed priorities as dictated by the foreign affairs strategies of donor countries are another 
factor in this shift in foreign aid to focusing on trade. Soon after taking office in September 
2013, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the integration of AusAID, 
Australia’s stand-alone aid agency, with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – to 
enable the closer alignment of the aid and diplomatic arms of Australia’s international policy 
agenda. The merger was effected in November 2013 and fully implemented by June 2014, 
when a new paradigm for the Australian foreign aid programme was unveiled which 
underlined opportunities for people, businesses and communities as the key to both 
promoting economic growth and reducing poverty (Lowy Institute for International Policy 
2016). The aid programme thus was expected to provide a sharper focus on investing in 
drivers of economic growth, including trade; infrastructure; education and health; and 
empowering women and girls to create new jobs and opportunities that lift people out of 
poverty. However, funding conflict and trade issues need not necessarily be competing 
donor priorities. This is because elevating peace and security would be in the interest of 
trade, by creating a conducive environment for conducting business. In addition, donors’ 
vision of sustainable, long-term ‘national security’ relies in part on genuine development 
contributing to a more stable order. 
2.4 Changing and challenging local political contexts  
The operating political environment for donors in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, South Sudan 
and Ethiopia is changing and mostly becoming difficult for the international community. For 
different reasons, Kenya and Uganda have a sometimes tense relationship with Western 
diplomats while Ethiopia has historically been hostile to the democratisation agenda that 
Western donors have promoted in Africa since the end of the cold war. Somalia and South 
Sudan are managing large-scale internal conflict, which has affected the kind of political 
investment that donors can make there. This has forced some of the donors to scale down 
some of the projects deemed to be too politically sensitive or those without political buy-in. 
 
USAID/Kenya in its current strategy is not directly funding programmes on judicial reform, 
security sector reform, human rights, public sector reform, or anti-corruption. It only focuses 
on devolution, recognising the key role that this will play as a driver of other reforms, and 
other issues will be addressed only as they relate to devolution. This shift is due to the US 
government’s restrictions and waiver requirements for engaging with security personnel as 
well as the feeling that other agencies, including the US Department of State, the UK’s 
DFID, and those of Sweden and other Scandinavian countries are active in this sector, 
                                                 
7 Interview with a donor overseeing projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 5 August 2016. 
8 Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kenya, Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014–2017, p.2. 
9 Ibid. 
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meaning that USAID funds could be utilised in another manner (USAID 2014: 25). The 
agency notes in its strategic plan: ‘This is where USAID/Kenya’s comparative advantage can 
be found and will be a critical component as it affects how government relates to its citizens, 
how resources will be allocated for social and economic development, and how the elements 
of the 2010 Constitution involving equity, justice, transparency, and accountability will be 
realized’ (ibid.).  
 
Lack of policy space to engage has led to significant re-thinking by USAID-Ethiopia of its 
democracy, governance and conflict mitigation work. In addition, it has been faced with a 
complex operating environment for its democracy and governance programmes, with clear 
constraints and disruptive interventions being applied without warning when the government 
feels hostile to ‘foreign intervention in politics’, and sees its interests threatened (USAID 
2012). Likewise, faced with a low level of commitment to civil and political rights, and 
continuing concerns about practices and behaviours within the security and justice sector, 
including incidents of unlawful or arbitrary arrest or detention, mistreatment in custody, and 
unfair trials, DFID-Ethiopia says it has decreased its support to the security and justice 
sector, opting instead to concentrate efforts to improve access to justice for girls and 
women.10 
 
Due to the conflict in South Sudan and political uncertainty there, donors have opted to 
support South Sudan’s security reforms at arm’s length, working through contractors, for 
example the US-funded Technical Advisory Team (TAT) and the UK- and Danish-funded 
Security and Defence Transformation Programme (SDTP), both of which were implemented 
by commercial contractors. This weakened the link between the technical and political 
dimensions of the interventions (Copeland 2015). Further, donors insisted on the country 
undertaking disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), without taking into account that the soldiers represented different 
political constituencies and hence the project became a failure despite donors having spent 
US$117m by the time South Sudan became independent (ibid.)  
 
While donors saw DDR as a binding CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] 
obligation and objectively necessary, to leading figures in the SPLM/A there was 
nothing objective about a programme that challenged South Sudan’s greatest 
internal political compromise and threatened to weaken the SPLA vis-à-vis the 
Sudan Armed Forces. Despite the 2006 Juba Declaration’s political impact on the 
security sector, DDR was not linked to internal political processes.  
(ibid.) 
 
Furthermore, donors in South Sudan have continued to rely on technocratic solutions for 
many essentially political problems – with predictably poor outcomes (ibid.). Understanding 
the politics of the day and how they affect projects related to reducing violence and conflict, 
is vital for donors since it helps them to identify instances where, because of political 
considerations, change is less likely or feasible, and to make decisions about programming 
accordingly. An astute analysis of the political, economic and social environment offers 
donors a sound understanding of where power lies and the conditions under which desired 
change may be possible. 
2.5 The ICC effect and push back on donor demands 
In the last five years, some of the African leaders, including Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and 
Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, have driven the pan-African agenda, through both rhetoric and 
policies, arguing that the continent needs to develop partnership with donors on an equal 
                                                 
10 In the Operational Plan 2011–16, it provided £3m to UNICEF to improve justice services for women and children in the 
Somali region of Ethiopia; see DFID (2014a). 
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basis. Two issues have been appropriated to this end – the Kenyan ICC cases and access 
to natural resources. 
 
During Kenya’s 2007/08 violence, civil society actors, with the financial support of many 
donors, had monitored and recorded the violence, identified suspected perpetrators and 
those who allegedly facilitated it. In addition, they had identified both victims and witnesses 
whose names they forwarded to the ICC when the Prosecutor started investigating the 
cases. Throughout the process, many donors and civil society organisations continued to 
publicly call for accountability for those responsible for the post-election violence. Their 
support for the ICC process continued after Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, both indicted 
by the ICC, won the 2013 elections as president and deputy president respectively. Kenyatta 
used the ICC cases as part of a broader narrative that recast the ICC and donors as tools of 
Western oppression, with statements that were supported by other African leaders. The 
African Union took the debate to a higher level when it passed a resolution calling for the 
non-prosecution of African leaders and threatened that its member states would leave the 
International Court (Daily Nation 2016a). Further, allegations of bias against Africans were 
levelled by the continent’s leaders who questioned why Western leaders were not being 
taken before the Court.11 This push by Kenya, which was strongly backed by Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, has informed the changing of relations between donors and, in particular, the 
Kenyan government. The Jubilee Government has since 2013 never quite mended relations 
with most of the country’s donors and has at times refused to approve requests for 
development aid or to have joint programmes, especially those touching on governance.12 
Indeed, donors note these frosty relations in their strategic plans, saying they are a point of 
concern and can affect their activities in Kenya.13  
 
Hence, while the genocide framed Rwanda’s relations with Western donors, Kenya has 
appropriated the ICC process as the main defining factor. Despite this, Kenya remains a key 
partner with the West because of its role in promoting security in the Horn of Africa, and the 
ICC effect does not seem to have soured relations with its donors in cases where they are 
funding counter-terrorism activities – largely due to the fact that Kenyan and donor state 
interests coincide on this matter. Hence, there is still scope for a large role for donors, but 
only if it is calibrated to what the states see as priorities. 
2.6 Leveraging of natural resources 
Largely borrowing from the pan-African agenda, Presidents Kenyatta and Kagame have 
persistently argued that their countries’ national interest is anchored in regional and 
continental integration and not linked to the international community whose role is seen as 
one of ‘extraction’ rather than that of empowering the local people. Notably, President 
Kenyatta announced as follows: ‘We should not allow non-Africans to take advantage of the 
continent’s inability to sustain itself for their selfish interests’ (The Star News 2016). This 
thinking has found traction with other continental leaders. A key informant said: 
 
In order to access natural resources, we have seen some leaders asking donors 
what they are giving in return and leaving in the country in terms of skill-sharing and 
finances. We now have to show something tangible especially on the business side, 
and [the] issue of governance is not attractive…14  
 
                                                 
11 Set up in 2002 as the last resort to try war criminals and perpetrators of genocide never tried at home, the ICC has opened 
inquiries involving nine nations, all but one of them African: Kenya, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Central African Republic (twice), Uganda, Mali and Georgia. 
12 Interview with a donor based in Nairobi, 5 August 2016. 
13 Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kenya, Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014–2017, p.6; interviews with a donor 
from a European country. 
14 Interview with a donor overseeing projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, 5 August 2016. 
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According to the Africa Natural Resources Centre, natural resources have been the bedrock 
of the continent’s economy and continue to represent a significant development opportunity 
for its people. In 2012, natural resources accounted for 77 per cent of total exports and 42 
per cent of government revenues (African Development Bank Group 2016). Whether Africa 
will ever fully benefit from its natural resources is a question that is more relevant now than 
ever, as new discoveries of coal, oil and gas across East Africa look set to transform global 
energy markets and the economies of the countries in that region. 
  
Few African countries process their own raw materials – rather, the value is added 
elsewhere, to the benefit of others. Much of the profits from resource extraction flow out of 
the continent entirely in the hands of foreign-owned companies which pay low rates of tax. 
Foreign-owned resource extraction companies are also often criticised for providing little in 
the way of local employment and contribution to local economies (Patrick 2014; Kabemba 
2014). Natural resources and the behaviour of countries carrying out the extraction thus are 
being used to redefine donor relations with East African countries. These structural changes 
have consequences for donor support to conflict-reduction programming, as discussed 
below.  
 
The factors discussed above have affected how donors fund different conflict and violence 
programmes in Eastern Africa. The themes and priorities that are emerging are discussed 
Section 3. 
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3 Where is the money going?  
3.1 State stabilisation 
Funding support aimed at state building, particularly in Somalia, is one of the key priority 
areas. This funding supports a combination of military, humanitarian, political and economic 
activities as part of efforts to strengthen the state’s capacity to control, contain and manage 
areas affected by armed conflict and complex emergencies (Collinson, Elhawary and 
Muggah 2010).  
 
A number of donors have pledged resources for these state-building interventions. For 
instance, on 17 June 2015 the EU, UK-DFID, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy pledged 
more than US$106m over three years towards joint programmes under the Peacebuilding 
and State building Goals (PSGs) of the Somali Compact, and the key deliverables of the 
government’s Vision 2016, with a specific focus on achieving results in the state formation 
process, constitutional review, electoral support, rule of law, youth employment, and 
institutional capacity development (UN Mission Somalia 2015).15 By putting funds through 
the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF),16 donors thus seek to 
support and bolster the fledgling Mogadishu-based administration against Al-Shabaab and 
to move away from project-based interventions to a more comprehensive engagement that 
seeks to boost the search for a more durable political settlement in Somalia (Hagmann 
2016: 16). Another example of basket funding is the Somali Stability Fund (SSF), a multi-
donor initiative financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Arab 
Emirates and the UK.17 It funds grass-roots conflict resolution, institution-building and 
governance projects in line with the government’s stabilisation policy and priorities agreed 
through the New Deal.18  
 
For its part, USAID is currently running the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) 
programme, which aims at increasing Somalia’s stability through fostering good governance, 
promoting economic recovery and reducing conflict (USAID 2016). Development 
Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) implements the programme in close partnership with the 
local and federal government, civil society and community members. It is currently 
implementing over 450 small grant activities and has supported a total of over 650 projects 
valued at US$38m. Further, the State Department, in the fiscal year (FY) 2016 requested 
US$87.7m to support stabilisation and reconciliation efforts; nascent political party 
development; civil society efforts to promote peace, good governance, and consensus-
building; and programmes in education, livelihoods and economic growth (Department of 
State, USA 2015: 84). 
 
Turkey has provided US$8.84m for the restructuring of the Somali army and police force, 
and trains Somalis in military academies in Turkey. It also offered to mediate between the 
                                                 
15 See also East African Community EAC Resource Mobilisation Office (2015) and DFID (2014b: 6). 
16 The SDRF is an umbrella architecture that streamlines funding instruments. It is supposed to make sure that all the funds and 
programmes are in line with the Somali priorities outlined in the Compact, to improve coordination and alignment of 
development assistance, and to encourage increased use of country systems over time. The SDRF incorporates several funds 
(UN, AfDB, World Bank) in a phased approach. See http://new-deal.so/somali-development-reconstruction-facility-sdrf/ 
17 http://stabilityfund.so/background/ 
18 The New Deal is supposed to be a fresh way of approaching a country’s transition out of fragility. Recognising that a shift was 
needed in how international assistance is provided, the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ was developed to better 
manage risks, increase the use of country systems, and increase the predictability of aid. Donors committed to helping fragile 
and conflict-affected states improve their ability to govern and to make development more responsive to the needs and 
concerns of citizens, by strengthening national capacities and improving transparency and accountability. The President of 
Somalia in late 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal process and principles in Somalia with the aim of establishing a 
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement with the country. See 
www.newdeal.so/content.php?id=2 
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Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the militant Al-Shabaab organisation, but the 
latter rejected this proposal. While most Somalis have praised Turkey’s role in their country, 
Al-Shabaab has been strongly critical (Shinn 2015: 9). During President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s visit to Uganda on 2 June 2016 he signed an Agreement on defence industry 
cooperation and a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation (Africa Defense 
2016). Though the finer details were not made public, it showed the intent of the two 
countries in collaborating on defence matters for conflict prevention. 
 
State building is also a key priority in South Sudan. In December 2013, as the South Sudan 
conflict escalated, donors decided to refocus their assistance, along three lines: they 
increased their humanitarian relief funds, while scaling down those supporting the security 
sector (Hemmer and Grinstead 2015); they also started exploring conflict-mitigation 
strategies through dialogue; and they stepped up their support for human rights 
organisations, civil society groups and media professionals in order to further justice and 
accountability (ibid.). Indeed, 58 per cent of the ODA (2013–14) funding to South Sudan 
(Table 3.1) was focused on humanitarian activities in order to enhance food security and 
promote ‘resilience’. 
Table 3.1 Bilateral ODA by sector for South Sudan, 2013–14 average 
Sector % 
Education 4 
Health and population 7 
Other social infrastructure 18 
Economic infrastructure 6 
Production 4 
Multi-sector 1 
Programme assistance 2 
Humanitarian aid 58 
Source: Adapted from OECD Stats (2016): www.oecd.org/countries/southsudan/aid-at-a-glance.htm 
 
The State Department in 2016 also requested US$30m in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
funds, which would most probably go to support efforts to resolve conflict or enforce stability 
in South Sudan, including through support for a regional conflict monitoring mechanism.19 
PKO funds support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not 
funded through the UN. Funds also address key gaps in capabilities to enable countries and 
regional organisations to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and counter-
terrorism (CT) operations, and to reform security forces in the aftermath of conflict. 
 
Apart from the humanitarian support, the DDR programme in South Sudan received a total 
contribution of nearly US$50.7m from donors during 2009–11 for the Individual Reintegration 
Component, of which US$2.3m was withdrawn in 2012. The donors include the Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund for South Sudan (MDTF-SS), and the governments of the UK, Canada, Norway, 
Germany, Sweden, Italy and Japan, as shown in Table 3.2 (Ghebremedhin and Tiberious 
2013).  
  
                                                 
19 Statement by Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Hearing: US Security Assistance in Africa, 4 June 
2015, www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060415_Blanchard_Testimony.pdf 
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Table 3.2 Programme resource by donor 
 
Source: Ghebremedhin and Tiberious (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year MDTF UK Canada Norway Germany Sweden Italy Japan Total 
2009 0 1,264,801 0 767,099 0 0 465,731 -6,063 2,491,569 
2010 6,807,755 139,763 37,330 4,094,535 780,730 343,474 305,010 0 12,508,597 
2011 16,339,409 92,469 765,170 0 1,628,909 0 0 0 18,825,955 
2012 13,306,484 0 0 3,705 0 0 0 0 13,310,190 
Expenditure (2009–2012) 36,453,648 1,497,033 802,500 4,865,339 2,409,639 343,474 770,741 -6,063 47,136,310 
Allocation (2009–2012) 36,491,144 1,497,033 802,500 4,865,525 2,409,639 343,474 770,741 -6,063 47,173,994 
Balance 37,496 0 0 186 0 0 0 0 37,683 
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3.2 Security sector reforms 
Donors’ interest and focus on security sector reforms in the developing world is said to have 
accelerated after the end of cold war when they were faced with demands for an effective 
donor role in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and anti-terrorism (Brzoska 
2003). Globally, the number of externally supported programmes that aim to improve 
security and justice outcomes, especially in fragile environments, has increased significantly 
in the last 15 years. In part this is because it has proved difficult to stimulate sustainable 
development without ensuring basic, inclusive safety and access to justice (van Veen 2016). 
Through these programmes, donors aim to assist in strengthening security sector reforms, 
enhancing accountability of the police and the building of relations between communities 
and societies and between state and society. The thinking is that an accountable and 
professional security sector will lead to an improved business climate linked to aid and trade, 
and other thematic priorities. Supporting security and the rule of law is therefore not only 
crucial for stability, but also vital for achieving donors’ economic objectives and those of the 
host country. 
In Kenya, programmes supporting security and the rule of law are wide and far-ranging but 
there is a stronger focus across the board on inclusive access to justice through judiciary 
and security sector reforms. For example, the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) in Kenya contributed US$3.1m in 2015 to support police reforms 
and civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (OpenAid 2016). The Royal 
Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi, UN Development Fund (UNDP), Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS 
Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework (UNAIDS-UBRAF) contributed a total 
of US$2.6m (2013–16) to the UNDP basket funds supporting the Judiciary Transformation 
Framework (UNDP 2013). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been 
supporting the Police Reforms Programme (2011–13), which seeks to transform the National 
Police Service (NPS) into an effective, efficient, accountable and trusted institution for 
Kenyans (ibid.). The main donors contributing to this basket are Australia, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the EU, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the 
USA, and One UN Funds. 
 
In order to address high levels of violence in the country, DFID Kenya established the Jamii 
Thabiti Programme, also known as the Kenya Improving Community Security programme 
(ICS) (Coffey 2016). Jamii Thabiti is a £13.5m, 3.5-year programme that aims to increase 
security and safety for men, women and children in Kenya through increasing the capacity of 
key institutions (such as the police and county government) to prevent and respond to 
violence. In doing so, the programme will address three types of violence: criminal violence, 
intercommunal violence and violence against women and girls (VAWG), initially in eight 
counties: Kisumu, Bungoma, Wajir, Mandera, Nakuru, Baringo, Kwale and Kilifi (Coffey 
2016: 1). This will be achieved through partnership agreements with at least 20 partners at 
the national and county level. 
 
USAID Kenya is the only donor in Kenya that is not directly or at the national level 
supporting security sector reforms. In its 2014–18 Country Development Cooperation 
Strategy it has made a strategic decision to focus on devolution, recognising the key role 
that this will play as a driver of other reforms. Its rationale is that if the devolution process is 
effectively implemented, then Kenya’s governance and economy will be sustainably 
transformed, propelling other reforms and also addressing other governance issues such as 
corruption, inequity and conflict. If devolution fails, then stability and rule of law will be 
compromised (USAID 2014: 25). As a result, judicial and security sector reforms (SSRs) are 
funded and supported only as they relate to devolution rather than as a stand-alone 
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programme. However, it is notable that funding to support SSRs is also channelled through 
other agencies, including the State Department. 
In Uganda, 14 donors, including Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, International Committee of the Red 
Cross, UNWOMEN, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and USAID are 
supporting the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS), a sector-wide approach adopted by 
the Government of Uganda to bring together institutions with closely linked mandates of 
administering justice and maintaining law and order and human rights. The UK and the EU 
Delegation participate as non-contributing members of this basket (JLos 2016). The 
formation of this mechanism shows the intention of the donors to have a holistic SSR 
programme, which in the long run is hoped to have more impact than the funding of 
individual sectors. The programme is currently supporting the implementation of the five-
year JLOS Sector Investment Plan III (2012/13–2016/17) which aims at strengthening the 
policy, legislative and regulatory framework, including the regulatory business environment, 
enhancing confidence in and access to JLOS services – particularly for vulnerable persons. 
This is intended ultimately to improve the safety of the person, security of property, 
observance of human rights and access to justice, with the aim of accelerating growth and 
increasing employment and prosperity (ibid.). 
 
In South Sudan, continued civil conflict and the alleged role of security forces in human 
rights violations during the violence led to donors laying more emphasis on SSRs. UK and 
US funding is supporting reforms in the defence sector, while UNDP support has 
concentrated on rule of law and crisis prevention (ISSAT 2016). For its part, the UN Mission 
in South Sudan (UNMISS) has trained diverse security sector actors (uniformed and non-
uniformed) especially with a view to enhancing South Sudan’s capacity in national security 
policy/strategy-making, and in monitoring, oversight and accountability matters. DFID’s 
2009–12 Peace-building Programme for South Sudan had a total budget of £5.5m, 
supporting civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution, reintegration, the 
control of small and light weapons, security systems management and reform, and the 
demobilisation of child soldiers.20 This support rose to nearly £16.8m in the DFID (2009–13) 
Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation project. The stated purpose of 
this project is to transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a professional, 
disciplined army operating under and accountable to democratic civil control, and to support 
the Government of South Sudan to develop broader civilian security decision-making 
architecture.21 In addition, the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan, a 
project involving 13 donor states and the World Bank, provided US$37m towards efforts 
aimed at SSR in 2012.22 State- and peace-building activities received an additional US$12m 
from this facility.  
 
The US State Department in FY 2016 requested US$10m to develop South Sudan’s 
capacity to provide civilian security and basic criminal justice services. In addition, technical 
assistance and training for South Sudan’s criminal justice sector officials would be 
undertaken, both through bilateral programmes and through support to the UN Mission in 
South Sudan. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) programmes 
funded through the State Department were to assist in enhancing short- and long-term 
stability as South Sudan transitions domestic security responsibility away from the military to 
the South Sudan National Police Service and develops its justice and correctional 
institutions (Department of State, USA 2015: 104). Further, US$30m was budgeted for 
supporting the SPLA to overcome the legacy of conflict and transform itself into an 
appropriately sized professional military that respects human rights, represents its 
                                                 
20 http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200321 
21 http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200329 
22 These are the latest figures available: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/MDTF-SS_factsheet.pdf 
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population, is accountable to elected leadership, protects the people of South Sudan, and 
encourages stability in the Horn of Africa (ibid.: 115). 
 
In Ethiopia, the UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa 2009–15 programme, ‘Promoting 
the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern Africa’, has been carrying out activities 
supporting criminal justice initiatives in the region. For example, from 18 March 2013 to      
31 December 2016, UNODC has been running the National Integrated Programme for 
Ethiopia, which aims at providing technical support to the Government of Ethiopia to develop 
an effective and responsible National Crime Prevention Strategy and Action Plan and to 
build the capacity of the country’s criminal justice systems to operate more effectively within 
the framework of the rule of law, while promoting human rights and protecting vulnerable 
groups. Criminal justice institutions supported under this programme include: Ministry of 
Justice, Justice Organs Professional Training Center, Ethiopia Justice and Legal System 
Research Institute, Federal Prison Administration, Federal and Regional State Courts, Child 
Justice Project Office, State Judicial Administrative Council, and Public Defender’s Office 
(UNODC 2016).  
 
In Somaliland, on 16 June 2016 the EU committed €48m for state-building and peace-
building actions to strengthen core state functions, rule of law, security (including support to 
police salaries) and the public finance management system (European Commission 2016b). 
UNODC, from 30 September 2010 to 31 March 2015, supported the Criminal Justice 
Programme, which aimed at providing technical support to the Government of Somaliland in 
implementing institutional reforms in its criminal justice sector at both central and regional 
levels, in accordance with UN conventions and international standards and norms.  
3.3 Addressing long-standing resource/pastoral conflicts  
Supporting efforts aimed at the improvement of livelihoods as an approach to conflict 
prevention is crucial in a region that faces major problems of regional and transboundary 
conflicts over natural resources, and pastoral and ethnic conflicts over pasture and water, in 
addition to many other issues. To this end, donors have invested in long-term programmes 
that seek to prevent recurrence of resource-based conflicts and to address some of their 
root causes.  
 
Chronically insecure in terms of food, under-provided in terms of government services, and 
vulnerable to cross-border incursions by livestock raiders, the Karamoja region of north-
eastern Uganda is also wracked by conflicts that pose a security risk for the country as a 
whole and for neighbouring Kenya. In order to mitigate the effects of conflict, donors are 
supporting efforts to improve the livelihoods of the local people. The USAID/Uganda Country 
Development Cooperation Strategy (2011–15) seeks to provide infrastructure and improved 
livelihoods, as well as to strengthen structures for peace and security necessary for 
development (USAID 2010: 6). To do this, it seeks to jointly work with the US Embassy and 
the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), especially the Combined Joint Task Force, 
Horn of Africa, ‘to implement carefully targeted interventions designed to promote improved 
livelihood options, reductions in cross-border tensions, and development of key institutions 
designed to improve the overall stability and peace in the region’ (ibid.: 20).  
 
The Karamoja Livelihoods Programme (KALIP), for which the EU provided €15m between 
2009 and 2015, aimed at promoting peace by supporting livelihoods, including agro-pastoral 
production and alternative income-generation opportunities for the people of Karamoja in 
north-eastern Uganda. The focus of KALIP is on improving livestock health, improving crop 
production to address immediate food security and basic incomes, and enhancing general 
peace and security in areas that are being resettled and re-establishing their production 
capacity (ReliefWeb 2015). Likewise, DFID provided nearly £538m to assist in enhancing 
resilience through Karamoja Uganda, a project that will run until 2017 and is being 
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implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF and the World Food 
Programme. 
 
USAID, through its Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace (SAFE) 
Programme (2012–17), aims at strengthening the capacity of the Government of Uganda 
with respect to peace-building and mitigation of conflicts over land, oil and ethnic diversity.23 
With funding of approximately US$15m, SAFE focuses on the oil-rich Albertine area, 
Northern Region, and Central Region as primary entry points. 
 
On 16 June 2016, the EU announced new funding for Somalia totalling €25m, for building 
resilience and enhancing youth employment for rural communities and urban households. 
The project is expected to focus on the most vulnerable population of Somalia, including 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) (European Commission 2016b). Almost a year earlier, on 
9 September 2015, the EU had launched an Emergency Trust Fund of about €1.8bn to 
address the root causes of instability in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad 
region, and North Africa, and to tackle illegal migration and displacement. From this fund, 
around €30m was earmarked for providing socioeconomic opportunities in coastal Kenya 
with the aim of providing and enhancing social and economic opportunities for young people, 
strengthening security in communities and promoting dialogue and trust between authorities 
and vulnerable groups of Kenyan society (ReliefWeb 2015). The 11th European 
Development Fund National Indicative Programme (NIP) which was launched by the EU and 
Kenya on 19 June 2014 includes a total indicative allocation of €435m. The programme 
concentrates on food security and agriculture as a key area for reducing poverty and 
improving governance and infrastructure (ibid.). 
3.4 Building resilience to counter violent extremism  
Addressing the root causes of violent extremism successfully starts by addressing factors 
that push and pull people to join extremist groups. While each country’s situation is different, 
it is largely the case that at the root of extremism is a combination of social and economic 
marginalisation, unaccountable governance, and inadequate institutions, among other push 
factors. Most of the countering violent extremism (CVE) funding seems to be concentrated in 
Kenya and the rolling out of similar initiatives in Uganda has been hindered ‘by the lack of a 
clearly defined programmatic response and an unorganized methodology for assigning 
Ugandan government offices and personnel to address CVE issues’ (USDOS 2016). In 
Ethiopia, the main focus is on counter-terrorism. 
 
UNDP Kenya is supporting a counter-terrorism project aimed at helping vulnerable local 
communities build resilience against negative and radical narratives that lead to violent 
extremism. The project will focus on facilitating the psychosocial rehabilitation of returnees 
who have disengaged from violent extremism and on assisting in their reintegration into 
society, with the goal of transforming them into a voice for countering radicalisation within 
their communities. It will also support the creation of cutting-edge and context-based 
knowledge products relating to radicalisation and violent extremism, in order to inform 
responsive CVE programming and policy options in Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Kilifi, Kwale, 
Tana River, Lamu, Mombasa and parts of Nairobi County (UNDP 2016). 
 
USAID Kenya, through the Strengthening Community Resilience Against Extremism 
(SCORE) programme (October 2014 – September 2019) is providing funding of nearly 
US$5m to strengthen community resilience against conflict and violent extremism, and to 
enhance the institutional functionality and technical capability of targeted CSOs to address 
conflict mitigation and CVE in the context of devolution. It is also seeking to establish a rapid 
response fund to effectively address emerging incidents of conflict and violent extremism in 
                                                 
23 www.usaidlandtenure.net/project/supporting-access-justice-fostering-peace-and-equity-uganda  
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Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mombasa, Taita Taveta and Tana River counties.24 ACT!, with Danish 
support totalling DKK30m (US$4.5m), is working with communities until 2020 to undertake 
activities seeking to achieve ‘improved coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts’.25 
 
Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa is a 
programme funded by the EU’s Instrument for contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) for 
€2m and implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). It aims to understand 
the drivers of violent extremism through evidence-based analysis, to develop best practices 
around CVE programming in the Horn of Africa through short pilot activities, and to provide 
recommendations for achieving increased impact and more focused interventions. Running 
from January 2014 to January 2017, the programme has three thematic priorities: youth 
engagement, investing in women, and capacity-building in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.  
 
DANIDA is also supporting a DDR project called ‘Serendi’ for Al-Shabaab defectors in 
Somalia (Brett et al. 2015: 31). USAID’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilization programme in 
Somaliland supports youth engagement activities in sports and arts, as well as practical job 
skills training workshops. The programme arose out of a realisation that high levels of 
unemployment and lack of education among youth make them susceptible to recruitment 
into violent extremism and sea piracy.26 
3.5 Increased funding for counter-terrorism efforts 
Donors are heavily funding counter-terrorism efforts in the Eastern Africa region. The 
possible reason for this is the fear that unstable countries like Somalia can become breeding 
grounds for terrorists who will later be exported to other countries. Indeed, one of the key 
tactics of groups such as al-Qaeda has been the recruitment of youths from Western 
countries. It is documented that foreign fighters who have joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia 
were previously part of groups that have carried out terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda, 
targeting both national and international interests.27 In addition, there is the fear that these 
foreign fighters will also find their way back to Europe and the US and lead attacks there. 
Western donors have therefore chosen to increase funding for counter-terrorism efforts even 
where they have been scaling down their funding for SSRs.  
 
The EU in 2015 pledged US$12m over five years for counter-terrorism training to help 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen to improve 
cross-border investigations and prosecutions (Reuters 2015). Ethiopia and Uganda are also 
among six African countries that are part of the US-supported, US$110m per year, African 
Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). This initiative aims to build the 
capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging 
conflicts.28 It was unveiled during the 2014 US–Africa Leaders’ Summit, and the US has 
announced an initial package of assistance to Ethiopia for the development of its airlift 
capabilities (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2015). APRRP complements 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance programme, and the International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support 
programme.  
 
                                                 
24 www.usaid.gov/documents/1860/strengthening-community-resilience-against-extremism-score 
25 Kenya Country Programme 2016–2020, 
http://kenya.um.dk/~/media/Kenya/DEDs/Governance/Gov%207%20ACT%20DED.pdf?la=en 
26 Email interview with donor operating in Somalia, 9 August 2016. 
27 Kenya, especially since its army went into Somalia in 2011, has faced increased attacks by the Al-Shabaab targeting Lamu, 
Mombasa, Eastleigh, Mandera and Garissa. Many young Kenyan men have also been recruited into Al-Shabaab. The 1998 US 
embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2013 Westgate attacks and the kidnapping of foreign nationals are some of 
the examples of international interests being targeted. Al-Shabaab was responsible for the 2010 attack on an Ethiopian 
restaurant in Kampala, whose customers were mostly foreigners.  
28 The other countries are Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania. 
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The EU is providing support to AMISOM, Eastern Africa Standby Forces (EASFCOM), the 
East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
for initiatives related to peace and security and regional stability. From April 2014 to 30 June 
2015, the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Programme provided the Maritime Security 
Programme (MASE) with €2.3m to strengthen the capacity of the Eastern Africa, Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region for implementation of the ESA-IO Regional 
Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Promoting Maritime Security.  
 
From 2007 to 2015, the EU provided €1.1bn to AMISOM to cover troop allowances, death 
and disability compensation for military and police personnel, international and local civilian 
staff salaries, operational costs of AMISOM, maintenance, running costs and equipment for 
the Al-Jazeera Training camp in Mogadishu, and Quick Impact Projects (Daily Nation 
2016b). Likewise, in FY 2016 the Department of State requested US$115m to be used to 
continue support to AMISOM, including training and advisory services, equipment and 
logistics support in relation to personnel/goods from current and new force-contributing 
countries not covered by the UN Support Office for the AMISOM (UNSOA). The funds were 
also to be used to professionalise, and provide training, advisory, equipment, logistical, 
operational, and facilities maintenance support to, Somali military forces, ensuring their 
capability to contribute to national peace and security in support of the international peace 
process efforts, and as part of a multi-sector approach to post-conflict SSR (Department of 
State, USA 2015: 114). 
 
In 2014, the State Department’s military assistance programme, International Military 
Education and Training (IMET), provided support to Ethiopia and Kenya amounting to 
US$589,000 and US$748,000 respectively.29 IMET among other things seeks to establish a 
rapport between the US military and the recipient country’s military in order to: build 
alliances for the future; enhance inter-operability and capabilities for joint operation; and 
improve professional military education. Further, in FY 2016 the State Department requested 
a total of US$390m from the President’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund for Non-
proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) Overseas 
Contingency Operations; of the total, US$90m would be used to prevent the creation of 
counter-terrorist safe havens in the Horn of Africa.30 
Ahead of President Barack Obama’s visit to Kenya on 24 July 2015, the State Department 
announced that the US would provide US$100m in counter-terrorism assistance to Kenya 
(Morello 2015). This is an estimated 163 per cent increase in such aid compared with the FY 
2014 total of US$38m (Security Assistance Monitor 2015). Of the US$100m, US$95m was 
to support the Kenyan military’s efforts in AMISOM (ibid.). 
 
The funds allocated to the Kenyan military are to enhance efforts for a ‘manoeuvre and 
border force, counter-IED, intelligence, and logistics’ and help Kenyan soldiers identify and 
target Al-Shabaab operatives and respond to terrorist attacks. Other funds will be focused 
on training the Kenyan military on key aspects of combating terrorism. The counter-terrorism 
funds have been increasing since 2012 (ibid.).  
 
Following the terrorist attack in Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall in September 2013, the 
EU provided a €19m support package in the area of counter-terrorism, under the IcSP 
(ReliefWeb 2015). The package has three components: €2m for STRIVE; €6m for a project 
on countering money-laundering and the financing of terrorism; and €11m for a project on 
strengthening regional counter-terrorism law enforcement (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
29 Statement by Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Hearing: U.S. Security Assistance in Africa, 4 June 
2015, www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060415_Blanchard_Testimony.pdf; see also Department of State, USA (2015). 
30 ibid. 
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Since 2008, the US has provided support in the form of military advisers and aircraft to 
Ugandan-led military operations to capture or kill Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
commanders. It has also provided humanitarian aid, pursued regional diplomacy, helped to 
fund early-warning systems, and supported multilateral programmes to demobilise and 
reintegrate ex-LRA combatants (Arieff, Blanchard and Husted 2015). According to a 
Congressional Research Service report, between 2009 and 2012 the State Department 
allocated over US$56m for supplies, equipment and logistics support to the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Congress increased the authorised annual funding level to 
US$50m for the period FY 2014 to FY 2017. In FY 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
used its ‘Section 1206’ authority to provide US$4.4m in counter-LRA-related training and 
equipment to the UPDF. DoD has also supported counter-LRA operations with intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as authorised by Congress, with over US$41m in 
FY 2013 and US$54m in FY 2014 (ibid.).  
 
The Department of State continues to support the Somali National Army and AMISOM in 
their efforts to push Al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. From 2007–14 it contributed more 
than half a billion dollars in training, equipment and logistical support to AMISOM. It has also 
invested more than US$170m to recruit and train forces to help protect Somalia’s institutions 
and citizens (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2014). 
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4 Conclusion 
 
The inclusion of Goal 16 in the SDGs reflects the growing international consensus that 
governance and peace and security are important for development. Internationally and in 
policy circles, there has emerged consensus around the basic elements of an approach to 
reduce violence. These include: (1) the need to create legitimate institutions, often through 
efforts to craft political settlements, (2) strengthening access to justice, (3) extending 
economic opportunities and employment, especially for young people, and (4) fostering 
societal resilience, both through institutions as well as by considering the sustainability of 
interventions (Lind, Mitchell and Rohwerder 2016). As this report notes, donors are funding 
these various elements and are establishing closer links between security and rule of law 
and with the trade agenda through an improved business climate, for the direct benefit of 
their home countries that are investing in the region.  
 
It is unfortunate that owing to a challenging political environment, some donors are moving 
to concentrate on fewer broad-based projects and themes in some of the countries. This is 
partly due to declining global funds but also to the realisation that there is no political will to 
engage in some of the issues, for example security sector and judicial reforms. Addressing 
violence and conflict in Eastern Africa will not be achieved without the commitment of 
development actors, both traditional and non-traditional. It will be necessary for these actors 
as well as governments to implement their own action plans, with their own targets and 
methods of accountability. 
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